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Government Sponsored Enterprises: A Discussion of the Federal
Subsidy of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
"Whatever the verdict, it is important for people to
understand the current debate. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were set up to produce a badly needed service to the United States
financial system. It is ironic that they may wind up becoming its
biggest threat."' By all accounts, the United States has built a
first-rate housing industry.2 Indeed, by 2000, homeownership in
the United States reached sixty-eight percent, the highest rate in
history.3 By that statistic alone, the housing government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) seem to be fulfilling their mission.4
Encouraged by this development, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) has declared that "[t]he current public
policy to expand homeownership and affordable rental housing by
using private capital ... has been a huge success."' However,
1. Eric Winig, Cracks in the Fannie-Freddie Foundation, WASH. Bus. J., Apr. 13,
2001, available at http://washington.bizjournals.comfwashingtontstoriei2001i4f16&
storyl.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
2 FANNIE MAE, THE FACTS ABOUT FANNIE MAE AND THE MORTGAGE
M.A,,RKET: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 1 (citing U.S. Dep't of Housing and
Urban Development, Apr. 21, 1999) [hereinafter FANNIE MAE, FACTS ABOuTi
FANNm MAE], at http:I//v,,.fanniemae.comlgloballpdflmedia issuesfarchivef2001I
010101.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2002). A deputy chief economist at Fannie Mae,
Fran K. Nothaft explains, "[iln most countries of the world, you have to be in the
upper reaches [of society] to get a home." Patrick Barta & Gregory Zuckerman,
Homeownership: The Perils of Success?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2001, at Al.
3. Barta & Zuckerman, supra note 2 at Al. Fannie Mae predicts that the
homeownership rate will reach 70% within the decade. See FANNIE MAE, FXCTS
ABOUT FANNIE MAE, supra note 2, at 1.
4. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
5. FANNIE MAE, SPECIAL STATEMENT: THE FACTS ABOUT FANNIE MAE AND
THE MORTGAGE MIARKET: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, at
http:'.lwwvv.fanniemae.comlnewlspecialldebt.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
Echoing these sentiments, one member of Congress has proclaimed, -[blecause of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the United States has the best mortgage markets in the
world." See Government Sponsored Enterprises: Joint Hcaring with Government
Reform on Government Sponsored Enterprises Before the House Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts., Secs., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, Comm. on Banking and Fin.
Services, and the Subcomr. on Gov't Mgmt., Information, and Technology. Comm.
on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 7 (1997) (statement of Rep. Carolyn
Maloney), available at http:flcommdocs.house.govlcommitteesjbanlhba4290.0001
hba4290_0.htm (last visited Feb. 28,2002) [hereinafter Maloney].
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critics suggest that there is more to the story.6 GSEs have come
under fire, and opponents have called for a series of reforms.
This Note examines the heated debate involving GSEs. In
particular, it outlines the criticisms leveled against government-
sponsored enterprises and assesses their validity. In the first
section, the Note defines government-sponsored enterprises,
explains why the housing GSEs were created, and identifies
Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac) as the major housing GSEs.' The Note then
compares the GSEs' federal charters with some of the activities
Fannie and Freddie are engaging in today, followed by an
introduction to the charge that GSEs have moved beyond their
public purpose.9 Next, the Note describes how critics have
organized in opposition to the GSEs and focuses on three of their
complaints. ° First, it explores whether subsidy dollars are going to
shareholders instead of mortgage borrowers." Second, it discusses
the contention that GSEs exercise duopoly power over the
industry." And, finally, it inquires whether GSE activities could
subject taxpayers to a huge bailout. 3 The following section of the
Note describes some reform proposals. 4 Finally, the Note
concludes that any changes to the structure and operation of GSEs
should be implemented judiciously. 5 In particular, it asserts that
reforms should not be carried out at the expense of mortgage
borrowers. 6
6. See infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 168-90 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 58-167 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 72-109 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 126-67 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 168-90 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
16. Id.
CHARTERS AND FEES
I. WHAT ARE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES?
A. Definition
"[GSEs] are financial intermediaries, established and
granted preferential treatment by federal law to increase the flow
of funds to specific uses but owned by investors to whom they owe
a fiduciary responsibility."' 7 Chartered by federal statute, GSEs
are treated "as instrumentalities of the federal government, rather
than fully private enterprises."'" The first GSE, the Farm Credit
System, was set up to provide real estate loans to ranchers and
farmers. 9 Subsequently, other GSEs were created to assist sectors
that were not adequately served by private credit markets.-'
Clarifying the role of GSEs, Representative Carolyn Maloney
explains, "a GSE should correct a market imperfection or credit
gap whose existence is detrimental to an important public
purpose... ,,2" Therefore, the notion of serving a public purpose is
inherent in the mission of every government-sponsored enterprise.
B. Why were the housing GSEs created?
The housing GSEs sought to ensure that money for
mortgages was available to homebuyers throughout the United
States.' Before the creation of these entities, many institutions
17. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUsING
GSEs 7 (May 2001) [hereinafter CBO REPORT], available at http:lvww.cbo.govl
pubs.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
18. Id. at 13.
19. Government Sponsored Enterprises: Joint Hearing writh Government Reform
on Government Sponsored Enterprises Before the House Subcomm. on
Capital Mlts., Secs., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, Comm. on Banhing and
Fin. Services, and the Subcomnm on Gov't Mgm., Information, and Technolog.
Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997) (statement of Rep.
Stephen Horn), available at http:lcommdoes.houtse.govlcommittcesfbanlhba42%03.
000fhba4290&__0.htm (last visited Feb. 24,2002).
20. Id. Homebuyers, students, and colleges are examples of the entities that have
benefited from the creation of government-sponsored enterprises. Id.
2L See Maloney, supra, note 5 (emphasis added). Representative Carolyn
Maloney (D-NY) was first elected in 1992 and serves on the House Financial Service3
Committee, the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, and the Joint
Economic Committee. For more information about Representative Maloney, see
http:Ilwv.w,,.house.govlmaloneyfbio.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2(102).
22. 1&
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had trouble maintaining a reliable flow of mortgage credit to
qualified homebuyers.23 In particular, geography played a major
role in determining who got lower rates.24 Representative
Maloney notes that institutions in areas with "a large volume of
home buyers" or "a healthy supply of new depositors" were able
to provide cheaper rates.25 In contrast, institutions in areas lacking
these conditions were forced to charge higher rates.2 6 Thus, the
mortgage market was inconsistent because people in some areas
got lower rates than people in other areas.27 Changing local
economies exacerbated this problem further." Since many
localities took turns facing bad economic times, mortgage rates
and availability fluctuated with shifting economic conditions.29
These problems led to the inevitable conclusion that something
had to be done in order to bring stability and consistency to the
industry.3"
The creation of the housing GSEs addressed this dilemma
by promoting liquidity in a secondary mortgage market.3" To
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Maloney, supra, note 5.
26. Id.
27. See FREDDIE MAC, WHY FREDDIE MAC [hereinafter FREDDIE MAC, WHY
FREDDIE], at http://www.freddiemac.com/ corporate/vital/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
On its website, Freddie Mac explains the unpredictability of the mortgage market
before the creation of GSEs:
Since the Great Depression, federal support for housing has been
an enduring public policy objective. Even in the 1960's, interest
rates varied widely from city to city across the country. The
mortgage market was unpredictable, and loans were sometimes
hard to get. Neither government nor private banking interests
could address the nation's housing finance needs alone.
Id.
28. Id.
29. See Maloney, supra, note 5.
30. See Vern McKinley, The Mounting Case for Privatizing Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 293, Dec. 29, 1997 [hereinafter McKinley,
Mounting Case], available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-293.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2002). Vern McKinley argues that Congress was aware of the market
failures in the mortgage industry. Id. He explains, "[members of Congress believed
that private markets alone were incapable of supporting such financial institutions,
and only through continued government sponsorship could such entities survive." Id.
31. FANNIE MAE, THE INDUSTRY [hereinafter FANNIE MAE, THE INDUSTRY], at
http://www.fanniemae.com/company/indusry.html (last visited Mar. 4,2002).
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understand how this process works, it is necessary to distinguish
between the primary mortgage market and the secondary
mortgage market. 2 The primary mortgage market is the place
where mortgages are originated and funds are loaned directly to
borrowers.3 In contrast, the secondary mortgage market is the
place where mortgages are bought and sold.' When lenders in the
primary market sell mortgages to secondary investors like GSEs,
the lenders accumulate capital that can later be used to generate
more loans." Summing up its role, Fannie Mae insists, "[a]lthough
we don't lend money directly to home buyers, we ensure that
mortgages are consistently available and affordable by buying
mortgages from a variety of institutions that do lend money
directly to home buyers."36 Since GSEs operate in every state in
the country,37 geography and changing local economic conditions
should no longer hinder the market. Therefore, with the help of
GSEs, mortgages should be accessible and affordable.
Currently, there are two major GSEs involved in the
housing industry: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac!' Fannie Mae was
established in 1938 "to bolster the housing industry during the
depression."39 In 1954, it became "a mixed ownership corporation
owned partly by private shareholders. ', '  The company changed
32. Id.
33. Id. The primary mortgage market consists of mortgage companies, savings
and loans, commercial banks, credit unions, and finance agencies. See id.
34. Id. Secondary market investors include GSEs, pension funds, insurance
companies, securities dealers, and financial institutions. See id.
35. FANNIE MAE, MORTGAGE INDUSTRY PRIMER, [hereinafter FAN.!;IE MAE,
MORTGAGE INDUSTRY PRIMER], http:lvw, v.fanniemae.comffaqlindustry.jhtml (last
visited Mar. 4,2002).
36. FANNIE MAE, THE INDUSTRY, supra note 31.
37. FANNTIE MAE, MORTGAGE INDUSTRY PRIMER, supra note 35.
38. U.S. DEP*T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT. REGULATION OF
GOxERNmENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES (GSEs). at http:#;wivww.hud.govlprogdescI
govspon.c (last visited Feb. 23, 2002). For a discussion of the evolution of OSE's,
see Government Sponsored Enterprises: Joint Hearing with Government Reform on
Government Sponsored Enterprises Before the House Subconm. on Capital MAlts.,
Sees., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, and the
Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt, Information, and Technology, Comm. on Gov't Reform
and Oversigh 105th Cong. 15-18 (1997) (statement of Thomas Woodvard)
(cited in CBO REPORT, supra note 17, at 7 n.1), available at http:IkommdoLs.house.
gov/committeesfbank/hba42908.0001hba42908_0.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
39. FANNIE MAE, UNDERSTANDING FANNIE MAE, at http:1w',w.fanniemae.com
aboutfmlunderstandinglindex.jhtml (last visited Feb. 23,2002).
40. FANNIE MAE, UNDERSTANDING FANNIE MAE: OUR HISTORY, at
20021
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again in 1968 when President Lyndon Johnson signed legislation
that converted Fannie Mae into a private, shareholder owned
company." Today, its mission is "to tear down barriers, lower
costs, and increase the opportunities for homeownership and
affordale rental housing for all Americans. 4'  Like Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac was designed to deal with nation's housing woes.43
Freddie Mac was chartered in 1970 to stabilize mortgage markets
and expand opportunity for home ownership and rental housing.'
Since its inception, Freddie Mac has financed homes for millions of
American families.
JI. OPPOSITION TO GSEs
A. What Fannie and Freddie are Chartered to Do Versus What
They Do Today
According to the GSEs' charters, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac are required to promote liquidity in the national secondary
mortgage market.46 Specifically, they are instructed to do the
following:
(1) provide stability in the secondary market for
residential mortgages;
(2) respond appropriately to the private capital
market;
(3) provide ongoing assistance to the secondary
market for residential mortgages (including
activities relating to mortgages on housing for low-
and moderate-income families involving a
reasonable economic return that may be less than
http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/understanding/history.jhtml (last visited Feb. 23,
2002).
41. Id. At this time, Fannie Mae began to operate as a GSE. CR0 REPORT,
supra note 17, at 1.
42. FANNIE MAE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: WHAT FANNIE MAE
DOES [hereinafter FANNIE MAE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS], at
http://www.fanniemae.com/Faq/231001a.jhtml?p=FAQ (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
43. FREDDIE MAC, WHY FREDDIE, supra note 27.
44. Id.
45. Freddie Mac, About Freddie Mac, at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/
about/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2000).
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the return earned on other activities) by increasing
the liquidity of mortgage investments and improving
the distribution of investment capital available for
residential mortgage financing;
(4) promote access to mortgage credit throughout
the Nation (including central cities, rural areas, and
underserved areas) by increasing the liquidity of
mortgage investments and improving the
distribution of investment capital available for
residential mortgage financing; and
(5) manage and liquidate federally owned mortgage
portfolios in an orderly manner, with a minimum of
adverse effect upon the residential mortgage market
and minimum loss to the Federal Government 7
Throughout the charter, the GSEs are called to carry out a
public purpose.42 Indeed, the provisions indicate that Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac should "provide stability," "promote access to
mortgage credit," and assist in "mortgages for low- and moderate
income families."4' 9
In spite of these targeted goals, GSEs are engaging in a
variety of other activities." For instance, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac have entered into subprime and home equity loans51
Additionally, it is alleged that the GSEs are taking other unusually




50. FM, WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH 4 (Oct, 1999) [hereinafter FM
WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH], httpJ/12,.121.228.1l71
resourceslvitalrole.phtml (follow link to pdf file) (last visited Feb. 22, 20021. Vern
McKinley details recent trends in the GSEs' risk assumption. McKinley, Mounting
Case, supra note 30. He explains, 'Ji]t is clear that many of the activities that the
GSEs are getting involved in are increasing their risk exposure. But, some activities
are also getting the GSEs increasingly far afield from vhat has been the core of their
existence-to sustain a liquid secondary market .... " Id., see also Ven McKinley,
Privatize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, USA TODAY MAGAZINE, July 1, 1993, at 16,
LEXIS News, Magazines, Stories, Combined (arguing that the GSEs have moved
beyond their core function) [hereinafter McKinley, Privatize Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac].
51. The subprime mortgage market involves "lending to riskier applicants v.ho
have been late on paying monthly credit cards or other debt." See McKinley,
Mounting Case, supra note 30; see also Winig, supra note 1.
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by holding more of their mortgage-backed securities in portfolio
and engaging in non-mortgage investments like Freddie Mac's
purchase of tobacco bonds.52 The GSEs do not deny that these
endeavors are risky.53 In fact, they suggest that engaging in risky
propositions is necessary to maintain a strong housing system in
the United States.54 Critics of GSEs suggest another theory.55
They maintain that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have moved
beyond their public purpose of serving homebuyers and are now
accommodating the needs of private stockholders.56 Moreover, it
is their contention that these new activities are outside the scope of
the GSEs' charter.
B. Opposition Groups
Frustrated by the GSEs' activities, a number of groups have
organized in opposition.58 One of the most outspoken critics, FM
Watch, describes itself as an alliance of financial sector and
housing-related trade associations working to ensure that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac put the interests of homebuyers and
taxpayers above the interests of their investors.59 FM Watch has
52. FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 5.
53. Winig, supra note 1.
54. Id.
55. See FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 5.
56. Id. This argument forms the backbone of many criticisms leveled against
GSEs. Id. Opponents have described this gradual move into lines of business as
"mission creep." Id.
57. Id. The Heritage Foundation has expressed its concern that the GSEs are
moving away from their public policy goal of making mortgages more available.
JOHN S. BARRY, WHY CONGRESS SHOULD PRIVATIZE FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE
MAC, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION COMMirEE BRIEF NO. 27 (Jul. 24, 1996),
available at, http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/regulation/cbrief27.htm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2002). Mr. Barry mentions a need to "ensure that the GSEs do
not .... stray from their original charters." Id.
58. Winig, supra note 1. Perhaps, the oldest nemesis of the GSEs is the National
Taxpayers Union (NTU). See Catherine Edwards, Fannie & Freddie in the Hot Seat,
INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, May 14, 2001, at 16. The NTU has been critical of GSEs for
over 25 years. Id. In 2001, the group alleged that the GSEs gave large sums of illegal
political contributions. Id.
59. For more information about FM Watch, visit www.fmwatch.org. FM Watch
is by no means the only group that has formed in opposition to the GSEs. For the
Competitive Enterprise Institute's position on the subject, see FRED L. SMITH, JR.,
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, FANNIE AND FREDDIE: FISCAL FRAUD (Aug.
31, 2000), available at http://www.cei.org/gencon/005,01855.cfm (last visited Feb. 23,
[Vol. 6526
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attacked Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for moving beyond their
charters into competitive private markets and subjecting American
taxpayers to unnecessary risk." In response, Fannie Mae insists
that these criticisms are self-serving. 1 It describes FM Watch as
"[a] group of mortgage insurers, high-cost lenders, and their allies
who want to roll back Fannie Mae policies to cut costs to
consumers. We call them the Coalition for Higher Mortgage costs
because if they had their way, the costs that Fannie Mae lowers for
consumers would go up., 62 This rhetoric reveals the animosity that
exists between the two groups. 3
Other groups and individuals have voiced concerns about
GSEs.6 A recent article in the Washington Business Journal
identifies a "growing contingent of critics-from scholars at the
American Enterprise Institute to the tiber-liberal Ralph Nader."'
Finally, a number of think tanks have expressed their discontent
with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac." The Cato Institute, the
Heritage Foundation, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute
(CEI) have recently published papers calling for changes in how
the GSEs operate.67
2002).
60. See FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH. supra note 50, at 6. FM
Watch contends that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have taken on these risks -in
order to maintain high profits and meet Wall Street's e-pectations." Id. at 4.
Similarly, the American Enterprise Institute has focused on the risk GSEs pose to
taxpayers. Lew Sichelman, American Enterprise Institute Warns of the Danger of a
GSE Bailout, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Mar. 13, 2U00, at 30.
61. FANNIE MAE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS. supra note 42.
62. 1&
63. Id.
64. Winig, supra note 1.
65. Id. In 1998, Ralph Nader cosponsored a forum on government-sponsored
enterprises. Ralph Nader, GSEs Warrant Public Scrutiny, NAT'L .ORTGAGE NEWS,
May 11, 1998, at 4. His purpose was "to open a long-overdue dialogue on a critically
important sector of our economy [the housing finance industry]." Id.
66. Winig, supra note 1.
67. Id. Both the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation have called for the
privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See McKinley. Mounting Case, supra
note 30; Barry, supra, note 57. The GSEs have questioned the objectivity of these
papers. See Winig, supra note 1. In particular, they allege that corporate entities,
such as big money banks, are sponsoring studies that are sympathetic to their views.
Id. Moreover, the GSEs insist that the papers are little more than veiled attacks from
competitors afraid of losing market share. Id.
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III. CALLS FOR REFORM
In spite of their success in building the nation's thriving
housing industry, GSEs now confront a number of criticisms.6"
First, critics claim that subsidy dollars are going to shareholders
instead of mortgage borrowers.69 Second, opponents argue that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have duopoly power over the
mortgage industry.7 ° Finally, detractors worry that GSE activities
could subject taxpayers to a huge bailout.7'
A. The Subsidy Issue
Of all the criticisms leveled against GSEs, the subsidy issue
is perhaps the most contentious.7" FM Watch insists that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are misusing their federal subsidies to make
profits for stockholders." In response, the GSEs deny that they
receive any subsidy from the federal government.
74
68. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. Fannie Mae has not shied away
from these criticisms. In one piece, the company notes:
Lately, a lot of stories are being told. You may have heard some
of them: stories about how Fannie Mae's debt skyrocketing out of
control and increasing the federal deficit, or how it is taking on
risks that will lead to its collapse, or how it grabs huge federal
subsidies with no return to homeowners.
FANNIE MAE, FACTS ABoUT FANNIE MAE, supra note 2, at 1.
69. FM WATCH, RESOURCES: FAcr SHEETS: THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH
[hereinafter FM WATCH, FACr SHEETS], http://128.121.228.117/resources/
vitalrole.phtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2002). The President of the Citizens Against
Government Waste also alludes to this point: "[t]heir need for incentives to retain a
high level of profitability is an obstacle to their performance." Catherine Edwards,
Fannie & Freddie in the Hot Seat, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, May 14, 2001, at 16.
70. See FM WATCH, FACr SHEETS, supra note 69; see also Steve Bergsman, Big
Competition: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, MORTGAGE BANKING No.8 VOL. 61,
May 1, 2001, at 35. (discussing the charge the GSEs are squeezing out competitors).
71. Winig, supra note 1. It is important to note that these are not the only
criticisms GSEs face. Id. For example, Ronald K. Schuster examines the possibility
that GSEs may actually be hindering many minorities from becoming homeowners.
See Ronald K. Schuster, Lending Discrimination: Is the Secondary Mortgage Market
Helping to Make the "American Dream" a Realityl 36 GONz. L. REv. 153, 155
(2000).
72. CBO REPORT, supra note 17, at preface. In fact, this issue became the subject
of Congressional Budget Office studies in 1996 and 2001. Id.
73. FM WATCH, FACT SHEETS, supra note 69. The CEI also alleges that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac "misallocate capital" to "management and shareholders." See
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In presenting this allegation, FM Watch relies on two
studies conducted by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)."
The CBO found that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac received an
estimated $6.8 billion subsidy in 1995.7" In May of 2001, the CBO
updated its findings, and the results were not favorable to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac." The CBO found that the GSEs total
subsidy was valued at $13.6 billion in 2000" More importantly,
the report indicated, -[n]ot all of the subsidy is passed through to
mortgage borrowers in the form of lower interest rates and fees on
mortgages."' 9 In fact, the CBO estimated that in 2000, mortgage
borrowers retained about half of the total subsidyl while
stockholders and shareholders netted thirty-seven percent of the
money. 1 Groups like FM Watch have gained ammunition from
the CBO report.$2 If the GSEs do receive a subsidy and part of
that money ends up in the hands of stockholders, then GSEs are
serving more than just a public purpose; they are also
accommodating the needs of private interests."
SITH, JR., supra note 59.
74. FANNmI MAE. SErriNG THE RECORD STRAIGHT: AN AAxLSIS SOF CBO'S 2011
REPORT ON FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC I (May 23, 2011) [hereinafter FA IE
MAE, SErG THE REcoRD STRAIGHT], at wv.waxa.fanniemae.coirissues-
cboresponses/jhtml (last visited Mar. 3,2002) (follow link to the pdf file).
75. CBO REPORT, supra note 17, at preface.
76. Id. at preface & 1.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1.
79. Id. at 25. The report also indicates that shareholders and stockholders of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac retain a portion of the subsidy because the special legal
status of those GSEs puts them at an advantage over competitors. Id. at 3.
So. Id. at 1.
81. Id at 5. It is important to note how the CBO determined the portion of the
subsidy retained by stockholders and shareholders. Id. Because conforming
mortgages are Fannie and Freddie's only line of business, the CBO assumes that the
portion of the subsidy not passed through to mortgage borrowers is retained by
shareholders and stakeholders. Id.
82. See FM WATCH, FACT SHEErs, supra note 69. The CBO report has bolstered
FM Watch's resolve. Id. The group points out that its membership list is "growing"
and now includes nine financial services and housing related associations. Id.
83. Winig, supra note 1. Others have made similar observations. Id. For
example, critics have argued that government subsidies "often wind up not in the
pockets of prospective home buyers, but in the coffers of Fannie, Freddie, and their
shareholders." Id.
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The GSEs defend this accusation by denying that they
receive any subsidy from the federal government."' In response to
the CBO study, Fannie Mae released its own report lambasting the
CBO for attempting to estimate the value of a subsidy that does
not explicitly exist.8 5 The Fannie Mae report proposes that the
GSEs do not benefit from any appropriation of federal funds.86 It
further states that, "[i]f the government were to revoke the Fannie
Mae charter, it [the government] would not receive a single
'subsidy' dollar ... "87 Technically, the report is accurate. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac do not receive a standard amount of money
from the government each year.8 Therefore, the government
would not be able to recapture money if the GSE charters were
revoked.89
On the other hand, although they do not receive a fixed
allocation of funds, the GSEs could still be receiving a subsidy.9"
First, the U.S. Treasury is authorized to lend $2.25 billion to both
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.9 More importantly, GSEs receive
direct benefits from their special legal status which treats them as
instrumentalities of the federal government, rather than fully
private entities.92 Chartered by federal statute, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are exempt from a number of fees and taxes that
would otherwise be collected by federal, state, and local
governments. 93 For instance, GSEs are exempt from state and
local income taxes, exempt from the Securities and Exchange
84. See FANNIE MAE, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 74 at 1.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 5. Fannie Mae also tries to bolster this argument by pointing out that it
paid $1.6 billion in taxes last year. Id. The implication is that the GSEs do not
receive money from the government. Id. Instead, they pay money to the
government. Id.
88. See Julie Kosterlitz, Siblings Fat and Sassy, NAT'L J., May 12, 2000, at 5. Julie
Kosterlitz explains that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "get no direct cash handouts
from the federal government." Id.
89. See FANNIE MAE, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 74 at 5.
90. CBO REPORT, supra note 17, at 13.
91. Id. at 13-14. A senior columnist for TheStreet.com insists that "untapped
credit lines" with the U.S. Treasury serve as a major operating advantage for Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. See Peter Eavis, Derivatives Risk Casts Long Shadow Over
Fannie, Freddie, THESTREET.COM, July 10, 2001, at http://www.thestreet.com/
comment/detox/1486090.html (last visited Feb. 24,2002).




Commission's (SEC's) regulation requirements and fees, and may
use the Federal Reserve as their fiscal agent."' The value of the
subsidy is also determined by the opportunity cost of providing
free credit enhancement to the GSEs because other institutions
would pay to receive similar treatment." These benefits provide
the GSEs with a major competitive edge over other institutions."
Therefore, although they do not get a fixed allocation of money,
the GSEs receive a tangible financial benefit from the
government?7 In fact, the CBO estimated that the savings from
the exemption of state and local income taxes, the exemption from
SEC regulation, and the lower cost of obtaining credit ratings for
debt and Mortgage-Backed Securities issues was $1.2 billion in
2000.9'
The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan,
has also expressed his belief that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
receive a subsidy from the federal government."" He explains:
The GSE subsidy is unusual in that its size is
determined by market perceptions, not by
legislation. Indeed, the prospectuses of the
debentures issued by GSEs explicitly state that they
are not backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States government. Accordingly, the extent
to which the subsidy is exploited is determined by
the extent to which GSEs choose to issue debt and
mortgage-based securities, not by legislation.""
94. Id GSEs are also exempt from many state investor protection laws. Id. at
13-14.
95. Id. at 13. The credit enhancement allows GSEs to receive lower borrowing
rates and higher profits than a non-chartered enterprise would receive. l.
96. McKinley. Privatize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. supra note 50. Vein
McKinley argues that "[w]ith these privileges granted to Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae, other potential competitors in their market are 'crowded out' because they
simply can not compete. It is no wonder that, vAth their many special benefits, they
have no direct competition from private, non-sponsored entities ...." Id.
97. See Kosterlitz, supra note SS. (explaining that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
"reap hefty benefits from their government lineage," even though they do not receive
"direct cash handouts.").
9S. CBO REPORT, supra note 17, at 15.
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Greenspan makes an important point.'' Although the amount of
the subsidy is not determined by legislation and fluctuates
according to market perceptions, GSEs are receiving some
financial benefit from the government.0 2 Greenspan's statement
also undercuts Fannie Mae's argument that the subsidy does not
explicitly exist.0 3  Whether explicit or not, Greenspan has
acknowledged that GSEs do receive a subsidy."°4
Although there is some controversy surrounding this issue,
it does appear that GSEs get some kind of subsidy from the
federal government. 5 Even though a number of critics have
questioned the validity of the CBO report,' the present data
suggests that some subsidy dollars are ending up in the hands of
shareholders, rather than mortgage borrowers." Perhaps
homebuyers are still the major beneficiaries of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac's activities.108 However, the fact that stockholders
101. Id.
102- Id.
103. See FANNIE MAE, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 74, at 1.
104. CBO REPORT, supra note 17, at 2 n.3 (citing a letter to Congressman Baker).
105. See supra notes 72-104, infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (discussing
arguments regarding the existence of a subsidy and the value of the alleged subsidy).
Id.
106. See James C. Miller & James E. Pearce, 5 Years Later, CBO No Wiser on
Fannie, Freddie, AM. BANKER, May 23, 2001, at 16. For example, James Miller and
James Pearce suggest that the CBO report overestimated the alleged subsidies to the
GSE's, inflated its estimate of the GSE's funding value, and failed to consider the
activities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that make the mortgage market more cost
effective. Id. They state that the CBO "missed the boat in 1996 and has done so
again in 2001. Its analysis is fundamentally flawed, and any policy change made on
the basis of the latest report could carry a big price tag for the American public." Id.
Others criticize the CBO report for posing the wrong question. Instead of trying to
measure a subsidy, the CBO should have explored what benefits would end if the
GSEs' special status were removed. See Alden Toevs, A Critique of the CBO's 2001
Study on "Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs" May 22, 2001, at 2 (on file with
the N.C. Banking Institute).
107. SMITH, JR., supra note 59; see also FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM
WATCH, supra note 50, at 4.
108. FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 4. The GSEs
have tried to deflect the subsidy issue by emphasizing that the homebuyers are still
the major beneficiaries. See FANNIE MAE, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra
note 74, at 2. "Fannie Mae provides more benefits than it realizes from any
theoretical 'subsidy.' Fannie Mae clearly adds value to the mortgage market far
beyond the confines of any theoretical model that the CBO has posited, even if that
model were accurately applies." Id.
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may also be benefiting implies that GSEs may have expanded
beyond their public purpose of serving homebuyers' t
B. Duopoly Power
The second criticism of GSEs is that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have become so large and so powerful that they now
exercise duopoly power over the entire industry."' Furthermore,
critics suggest that the GSEs' operating advantages squeeze out
competition to the detriment of consumers. t'
The size and strength of GSEs is indisputable." 2 Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac either own or insure the risk on forty to
forty-five percent of America's residential mortgages."' Further,
Fannie Mae is the largest investor in home mortgages today."'
Keenly aware of the GSEs' prowess, critics have accused Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac of exercising "duopoly power.....S The
implication is that Fannie and Freddie utilize their special status to
dominate the market.1 6 But, this argument is extended further.
Critics proclaim that the GSEs' operating advantages squeeze out
109. FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 4; see also
SMITH, JR., supra note 59.
110. FI WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 4. By 205 or
earlier, FM Watch estimates that the GSEs will own or guarantee nearly half of all
mortgages in America. Id. at 3: see also Steve Bergsman, Big Competition; -annie
Mae and Freddie Mac, 61 MORTGAGE BANKING No. 8, lay 1, 201, at 36.
111. See Bergsman, supra note 110, at 36.
112. See FANNIm MAE, THE INDUSTRY, supra note 31. Even Fannie Mae has
aclmowledged its own prowess: "[wle are at the heart of the U.S. housing industry-an
enormous industry that is $4.5 trillion strong." Id. Lilkewise, Freddie Mac has
become an industry mogul. Erick Bergquist, Can Brendsel (and Freddiel Stay, on a
Roll?, Am. BANKER, Dec. 6,2001, at 1. The company has tripled in size every three
years in the 1990's and is now seventy percent of Fannie Mae's size. Id.
113. Big Scary Monsters, THE EcONOIsT. Jul. 21, 2001, at 5909 [hereinafter Big
Scary Monsters]. According to its figures, Fannie Mae currently owns in portfolio or
holds in trust for investors one out of every five mortgages in the United States. See
FANNIE MAE, MORTGAGE INDUSTRY PRIMER, supra note 35.
114. See FA.NNIE MIAE, MORTGAGE INDUSTRY PRIMER, supra note 35.
115. FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FMN WATCH, supra note 50, at 5. Other
critics have made similar suggestions. Fred Smith contends, -It]he rapid grov, th of
Fannie and Freddie during the 1990's suggests that the agencies are well on their, ay
to becoming just that [monopolists]." SMITH, JR., supra note 59.
116. A Policy Analyst for the Heritage Foundation has noted Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac's domination by referring to them as -800-pound gorillas in the capital
markets." Barry, supra, note 57.
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competition to the detriment of consumers.'17 In other words,
without competition, the goal of reducing consumer costs cannot
be fully achieved.' 1
8
For their part, the GSEs seem unmoved by this criticism." 9
In fact, they argue that the U.S. mortgage market is in good
shape 20 and that consumer prices have been reduced by the
activities of GSEs. 2' Additionally, on its website, Fannie Mae
explains that in the 1990's alone, it helped twenty-three million
families become homeowners, assisted two million families in
obtaining affordable rental housing, and directly saved consumers
twenty billion dollars by lowering mortgage costs. I22 The argument
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are becoming too big is
compelling for its competitors in the industry.' They believe that
GSEs unfairly dominate the market, and reforming GSEs will
benefit their businesses. 4 However, for the typical homebuyer,
this criticism may be less important. If GSEs are helping to keep
mortgage costs down, the average consumer is unlikely to be
concerned about any alleged "duopoly power. ' '" 2s
117. FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 5. Mr. Barry
also notes that this lack of competition harms private firms themselves: "[p]rivate
firms cannot compete with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The federal government,
in essence, has created a duopoly that hinders innovation and prevents consumers
from obtaining the most efficient delivery of home mortgages." Barry, supra, note
57.
118. FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 5.
119. See FANNIE MAE, THE INDUSTRY, supra note 31. On its website, Fannie
points out that the company is "a secondary market lender" that plays a "critical role
in providing a steady stream of mortgage funds to lenders across the country .... Id.
120. See generally supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing the increase
in homeownership). Compared to the state of the mortgage industry before the
creation of the GSEs, today's market is in relatively good shape. Id.
121. FANNIE MAE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 42. According to
Fannie Mae, the company "lowers the cost of homeownership on average by $15,000
on every 30-year mortgage it funds." Id.
122. FANNIE MAE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 42.
123. See supra notes 110-22, infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
124. Id.
125. See FANNIE MAE, FOR THE MEDIA: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at
http://www.fanniemae.com/news/media/faqs/faqs.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). For
a different perspective on this issue, see Robert Julavits, MPF Gaining Steadily on
Fannie and Freddie, AM. BANKER, Jan. 22, 2002, at 10 (noting that a growing threat
to GSE dominance gained ground in 2001).
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C. Taxpayer Bailout
The third criticism of GSEs is much more ominous12 6
Essentially, opponents argue that GSEs have taken on so much
risk that they now pose a serious threat to the United States
economy. 27 The crux of this argument is that if the GSEs' riskier
investments fail, then taxpayers are likely to foot the bill.!'2 This
section looks at two issues related to the taxpayer bailout issue: the
government guarantee and new activities of GSEs.
1. Government Guarantee
The issue of a taxpayer bailout is directly related to the
question of whether GSEs are backed financially by the federal
government. 12 9 Because of their size and quasi-governmental
status, some people believe that GSEs have an implied guarantee
from the Federal government.' Accordingly, "if the GSEs ever
default on their debts, the Federal government would step in, and
the U.S. taxpayer would pay the cost..'. However, GSEs reject
126. Winig, supra note 1.
127. Id Critics have argued that this systemic risk to the United States economy is
"aldn to the savings and loan debacle of a decade ago." See id. Undoubtedly, these
fears were exacerbated in light of the September 11 attacks on Washington, D.C. and
New York City. See Richard Cowden, Falcon Says GSEs Operated Normally in
Aftermath of Sept. 11 Terror Attacks, BANKING REPORT, Oct. 22, 2001, at 645.46.
However, according to OFHEO's Director, Armando Falcon Jr., the events had little
or no effect on the safety and soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Id. Falcon
explained, "As you might guess, there were disruptions to the enterprises' normal
operations, but there was nothing that threatened their safety and soundness. In
general terms, the problems encountered were solved through alternatives and vork-
arounds." Id.
128. FNI WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM VATCH, supra note 50, at 5. The
President of the Citizens Against Government Waste, Tom Schatz, contends that
American taxpayers are at risk since the GSEs operate under a congressional charter.
Edwards, supra note 69, at 16.
129. McKinley, Privatize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, supra note 50, at 16. Vein
McKinley addresses the possibility of a government bailout. Id. He explains that
Congress may choose to bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac if it "is convinced that
the failure of one of these financial giants would disrupt the mortgage markets." Id.
130. SINrMn, JR., supra note 59. Fred Smith suggests that this implicit guarantee
leads the market to believe that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "are safer investments
than other ventures."
131. FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 5.
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the notion of an implied governmental guarantee.'32 At least two
commentators argue, "GSE markets are 'made' by sophisticated
market participants who know very well there is no legal
obligation of the U.S. Government to back GSE debt." 133
Whether market participants are aware of this fact may be open to
debate, but disclaimers in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
literature support their argument.' For example, in its circulars
for debt and mortgage-backed securities, Fannie Mae includes the
statement: "[t]he Securities... are not guaranteed by the United
States and do not constitute a debt or obligation of the United
States." '35 This disclaimer explicitly states that the United States is
not obligated to bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
13 6
However, the idea of an implied guarantee suggests that in
spite of such disclaimers, the federal government would intervene
in the event of a major catastrophe. 37 In 1991, Senator Herb
Kohl138 explained, "[w]hile it is not explicitly stated, the market
believes, and it is true that were a GSE to go belly up it would
have the full faith and credit of the Government behind it.' 139 To
132. JAMES C. MILLER & JAMES E. PEARCE, FREDDIE MAC, RESPONSE TO CBO's
DRAFT REPORT: FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND HOUSING GSEs (May 18, 2001)
[hereinafter MILLER & PEARCE, RESPONSE TO CBO's DRAFT REPORT], at
http:llwww.freddiemac.conlnews/analysis/gse-benefits2.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2002).
133. Id. James C. Miller is the director of the Law and Economics Consulting
Group in Washington, D.C. Id. James E. Pearce is the Vice President of Welch
Consulting which is located in College Station, Texas. Id.
134. FANNIE MAE, FACTS ABOUT FANNIE MAE, supra note 2, at 4.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Kosterlitz, supra note 88, at 15. This reasoning has persuaded some Wall
Street analysts. Id. For instance, a consumer finance analyst at Paine Webber, Gary
Gordon, told CNN, "[t]here's no explicit guarantee of their [GSEs'] debt, but that
implied guarantee is pretty powerful." Id.
138. Herb Kohl (D-WI) was first elected in 1988 and currently serves on the
Senate Appropriations Committee, Judiciary Committee, and the Special Committee
on Aging. For more information about Senator Kohl, see http://www.senate.
gov/-kohllbio.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
139. Various Proposals to Regulate GSE's and to Examine the Risk These Entities
Pose to U.S. Taxpayers, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Government Information
and Regulation of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong. 1 (1991)
(statement of Senator Herb Kohl) [hereinafter Proposals to Regulate GSEs].
Commentators have also espoused the notion that GSEs' are "too big to fail." See
Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises are "Too Big To Fail":
Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L. J., 992, 992 (1993). Under this
view, the federal government voluntarily keeps troubled institutions operating
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further substantiate this assertion, Senator Kohl noted that in
1987, the Government provided billions of dollars to bail out the
Farm Credit System, even though this system was not subject to an
explicit government guarantee. 40 Certainly, this evidence of past
history strengthens the claim that the government would step in if
a GSE collapsed. 4  In fact, some evidence shows that the
government has already interceded to help the housing GSEs. "-
For example, between 1979 and 1984, rising interest rates left
Fannie Mae insolvent.1 43  In response, the federal government
granted Fannie Mae tax relief until falling interest rates rescued
the company."M This example is particularly compelling because it
is direct evidence of the government's willingness to bail out
Fannie Mae.
In response to this reasoning, the GSEs make one final
rebuttal: if the disaster was grave enough, the government would
intervene to bail out any major financial institution, even those
that do not have a guarantee from the federal government. 4 This
argument suggests that bailing out the GSEs would not differ from
federal intervention when other events have threatened the
stability of financial markets.4 ' As recently as 1998, the federal
government intervened to assist Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM), a hedge fund that caused a worldwide crisis when it
because their failure would have a worse effect on the economy than would the cost
of rescuing them. See Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a
Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L. J. 951,968-72 (1992).
140. Proposals to Regulate GSE's, supra note 139. Vern McKinley also mentions
the Farm Credit System debacle to illustrate his contention that the GSEs are
"financial time bombs." McKinley, Mounting Case. supra note 30. He explains that
in the 1980's, the federal government paid billions of dollars to bail out the Farm
Credit System. Id. McKinley concludes, "Clearly, the possibility of the failure of a
GSE is more than a theoretical notion." l
141. Proposals to Regulate GSE's (statement of Senator Herb Kohl), supra note
139.
142. Kosterlitz, supra note 88, at 15.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. MILLER & PEARCE, RESPONSE TO CBO's DRAFT REFORT, supra note 132.
Miller and Pearce contend, -[m]arket participants might believe it likely the federal
government would step in should there be a catastrophic failure, but the same
argument would apply to other financial institutions. Indeed, the argument might
apply to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae even if the charter were removed." Id.
146. Id.
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became insolvent.47 If the Federal government intervened to save
LTCM, why would it refuse to bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac? Perhaps the notion of an implied guarantee is less
significant in determining when the government will bail out an
institution. More importantly, if the government is willing to bail
out all financial institutions, then the fear of a taxpayer bailout is
not as strong of an argument for opponents.
2. New Activities
Evidence that GSEs are engaging in riskier endeavors
supports those who fear a taxpayer bailout. 8 One commentator
suggests that the GSEs are engaging in a "moral hazard," or a
situation in which one takes on more risks because one is not fully
responsible for them.'49 Some evidence supports this contention. 5 '
For instance, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have entered into
subprime and home-equity loans.' Additionally, it is alleged that
the GSEs have begun assuming both the credit and interest rate
risk by holding more of their mortgage-backed securities in
portfolio and engaging in non-mortgage investments like Freddie
Mac's purchase of tobacco bonds.12 Critics contend that if these
investments fail, taxpayers are likely to bear the cost.
153
147. Winig, supra note 1.
148. SMITH, JR., supra note 59.
149. Id. Mr. Smith notes that other institutions have engaged in moral hazards.
Id. For instance, the IMF and the World Bank have shown a willingness to lend to
developing countries. Id.
150. Winig, supra note 1.
151. Id. It is important to note why these endeavors are more risky. FM WATCH,
THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 5. According to critics, the GSEs
have little capital or loss reserves. Id. Thus, if these investments fail, taxpayers are
likely to bear the cost. Id. For more information on GSEs' engagement in risky
endeavors, see McKinley, Mounting Case, supra note 30 and McKinley, Privatize
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, supra note 50.
152. FM WATCH, THE VITAL ROLE OF FM WATCH, supra note 50, at 5. In 1998,
Freddie Mac's congressional overseers criticized the company's decision to add $340
million in tobacco company bonds in its investment portfolio. Bergquist, supra note
112. Republican Congressman, Jim Leach commented, "[s]houldn't there be a
specific obligation to maintain a culture that's above reproach?" Bergquist, supra
note 112.
153. Sichelman, supra note 60. A recent study by the American Enterprise
Institute bolsters this claim. Id. The report suggests that Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac are "a disaster waiting to happen." Id. They suggest that if Congress does not
intervene, taxpayers will have to pay the companies' $1.8 trillion debt. Id.
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Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dismiss this rhetoric as
alarmist and inaccurate.154 They contend that engaging in risky
endeavors is necessary to maintain a strong housing system in the
United States. 5 ' Perhaps, some risky endeavors are necessary to
promote liquidity in the secondary mortgage market.Y If so, the
GSEs may be justified in taking on some risk.' In response to the
fear of a taxpayer bailout, the GSEs also cite experts who attest to
the company's ability to manage risk. '5  For example, Fannie
Mae's regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO)Y9 explained in its 1999 report to Congress,
"[t]he 1998 examinations found both enterprises to be financially
sound and well managed.... The results of the 1998 examination
show that in all categories, Fannie Mae exceeds safety
and soundness standards. " '6It Undoubtedly, this endorsement
from OFHEO undercuts opponents' grim predictions.'" It is
reasonable to infer that if GSEs presented a grave danger, then
their regulator would be the first to warn members of Congress
and the public.'6 2 Finally, Fannie Mae's Chief Financial Officer, J.
Timothy Howard, maintained the firm "could endure the worst
economic shocks in history-shocks that few other institutions
154. Winig, supra note 1.
155. Id.
156. See FANNIE MAE, FACTS ABOUT FANNIE MAE, supra note 2, at 15. In spite of
these potentially necessary risks, the GSEs maintain that they are "regulated,
transparent companies with a narrow charter and a simple and safe product line." Id.
157. Id at 24. Fannie Mae is quick to point out that taking risks has led to positive
results. Id The company argues that the current system has produced the most
sophisticated housing finance system in the world. Id.
158. Id at 14. For a listing of these experts, see FANNIE MAE, FACTS ABOUT
FAN ,IE IvLAE, supra note 2, at 14.
159. See U.S. DEPT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38.
OFHEO is an independent regulatory office within HUD that monitors the financial
safety and soundness of GSEs. Id.
160. FANNiE MAE, FACTS ABOUT FANNIE MAE, supra note 2, at 14.
161. 1l Receiving approval from OFHEO is also important because OFHEO has
a broad range of authority including the power to conduct examinations. issue
subpoenas, report to Congress, and limit GSE executive pay levels. See U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38.
162. FANNIE MAE, FACTS ABOUT FANNIE MAE, supra note 2, at 14. Recently,
Congress passed a five million dollar budget increase for the OFHEO. See Congress
Increases Agency Funding to Check Government Sponsored Enterprises, BX.NtNG
REPORT, Nov. 11. 2001, at 803. Perhaps, this additional funding vill be helpful in
regulating the activities of the GSEs. ld.
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could survive-with significant capital left over."' 3 This statement
reveals the company's self-confidence in its ability to handle risk.
The concern about a taxpayer bailout is a serious
allegation."6 While the idea of an implicit guarantee is vigorously
debated, it may not be so significant. 65 If the GSEs pose a major
threat to world markets, the federal government is likely to
intervene, regardless of any explicit or implicit guarantee. 6 6 What
is more important is whether the GSEs' expansion into new
activities poses a serious economic risk. 67 Unfortunately, the
plausibility of the taxpayer bailout theory depends largely upon
whose rhetoric you believe. Therefore, it is very difficult to
determine how serious the threat of a taxpayer bailout really is.
IV. REFORM PROPOSALS
In light of the criticisms launched against GSEs, some
opponents have called for reform. 68 Although there are a number
of proposals being considered, this section emphasizes three
possibilities: privatizing the institutions, doing nothing, and
creating competitors for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
A. Privatization
Under a privatization scheme, the government would sever
the GSEs' links to the Treasury and allow them to operate as
private enterprises. 69 One plan suggests splitting Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac into several smaller privately held companies. 7 '
Proponents contend that this plan would provide liquidity in the
housing market without the dangers of having a huge amount of
163. Winig, supra note 1.
164. Id.
165. MILLER & PEARCE, RESPONSE TO CBO's DRAFT REPORT, supra note 132.
166. Id.
167. SMITH, JR., supra note 59.
168. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
169. Winig, supra note 1.
170. Id. Some critics have noted that this plan resembles the recent proposal to
break Microsoft into smaller pieces. Id. The plan is also analogous to the 1980's
breakup of AT&T. Id.
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mortgages in one place."' However, like any public policy, it is
difficult to account for unforeseen consequences. For example,
could four smaller companies really deliver the same benefits to
mortgage borrowers? Expressing her reservations about
privatization, Representative Maloney noted, "[a] privatized world
would be a far different, more segmented housing finance system
than the reliable and consistent one we have today."' 72 Maloney's
statement implies that the "solution" of privatization may be more
dangerous than the "problem" it seeks to resolve.173
The biggest challenge to the privatization plan is that it may
be politically infeasible. 74 However, one analyst insists, " [w]ere
Fannie and Freddie broken into four or so private firms
nationwide, each assigned a diversified share of the holdings of the
current monopolies, privatization would be much less traumatic
and far less risky politically."' 75 In spite of this optimism, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac appear unwilling to stay out of the
privatization fight.'76 The GSEs urge Congress to support their
position on the issue: do nothing.'"
171. ld. Proponents also suggest that privatization would remove the burden of
having an implied guarantee from the government. Id. However, governmental
bailouts are possible with or without an implied guarantee. Id. Indeed, if the four
companies' failure threatened the U.S. economy, it is likely that the federal
government would intervene. Ia In short, removing the implied guarantee does not
remove the potential for risk. Id.
172. See Maloney, supra, note 5.
173. 1&
174. Kosterlitz, supra note 88. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been succe sful
in their efforts to shoot down reform legislation. Id. The companies have done so by
forging friendships with powerful members of Congress and attacking those vho
undermine their interests. Id. For these reasons, Julie Kosterlitz concludes that it is
difficult to envision Congress taking action on any legislative proposal. Id.
175. SmrrH, JR., supra note 59.
176. Kosterlitz, supra note 8. The GSEs yield a tremendous amount of influence
over members of Congress. Id. A Lehman Brothers analyst, Kim N. Wallace
explains, "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at a moment's notice can inform all 535
elected members of Congress just how many houses in their districts and states save
how much money every month by having [government-sponsored enterprises] in the
secondary market." L.
177. Winig, supra note 1.
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B. Do Nothing
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac urge Congress to refrain
from making changes that could adversely affect the thriving
housing finance system in the United States.' The CEO of
Fannie Mae, Franklin D. Raines opines, "[w]e don't think that you
ought to start pulling threads from this tapestry that makes up the
U.S. housing finance system unless you have a really good
reason."' Raines's statement is a reminder that the GSEs play an
integral role in the U.S. housing industry.8 Moreover, the
statement suggests that changing the structure of GSEs could have
far-reaching effects."8 ' New legislation will not only affect
employees and stockholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; it
will also influence the entire mortgage industry and potentially
every homebuyer in the United States. The creation of the GSEs
transformed an unstable housing industry into one that is revered
around the globe.182 In their efforts to deal with the shortcomings
of GSEs, Congress should exercise restraint. Any abrupt changes
could shake the foundation of the U.S. housing industry.
C. Create Competitors for Fannie and Freddie
Recognizing the problems associated with GSEs, some
leaders have suggested forming competitors to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.183 For instance, the Bush administration has spoken
privately about licensing new rivals that would put competitive
pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.'84 Similarly, at a
178. Id.
179. Winig, supra note 1.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. In 1999, the United States had its highest homeownership rate in history.
FANNIE MAE, FACTS ABOUT FANNIE MAE, supra note 2, at 1.
183. Big Scary Monsters, supra note 113, at 59-60.
184. Id. The Bush administration has already taken a tougher stance toward
GSEs. Id. On July 17, 2001, the administration backed new rules related to risk-
based capital adequacy. Id. These rules will become effective one year from that
date. Id. However, there is a strong possibility that the administration will not do
anything else. Nicholas Kulish, Prospect of Rivals to Fannie, Freddie Is Raised by
Baker, WALL ST. J., July 12,2001, at A6. Glenn Hubbard, the Chairman of the White
House Council on Economic Advisors, suggested that President Bush may prefer to
spend political capital on other issues. Id.
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hearing on July 11, 2001, Representative Richard Baker""5
mentioned the possibility of licensing new home-loan agencies to
compete with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.'"' This measure may
assuage the complaint that the GSEs exercise duopoly power." 7
With more players in the game, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
would have a harder time dominating the mortgage industry.""
On the other hand, the proposal would do little for those
institutions who currently compete with GSEs. In fact, licensing
more GSEs may be harmful to groups that lack the advantages of
being government sponsored. Supporters of this plan also contend
that it would infuse enough competition to "force Fannie and
Freddie to pass more of their subsidy on to consumers."'"
Certainly, this would be a positive step in forcing GSEs to serve
their public purpose of serving mortgage borrowers. On the other
hand, this is a speculative prediction at best. There is no way to
lkow what effects competitors might have on the industry."'
V. CONCLUSION
Government-sponsored enterprises were set up to carry out
a badly needed service. 191 By most accounts, the GSEs have been
successful.' 92 More Americans are homeowners, and the mortgage
185. Big Scary Monsters, supra note 113, at 59-60. Congressman Baker is the
Chairman of the House Banking Committee. Id. Before this hearing, he had been
advocating the creation of a tough new regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Id- However, he appears to be considering the Bush proposal. i.
186. Big Scary Monsters, supra note 113, at 59-60. Recently, Rep. Marge
Roukema (R-NJ.) and Sen. Wayne Alllard (R-Colo.) offered legislation that vould
place the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) in direct
competition v.ith Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Tommy Fernandez, Move to Let
Ginnie Rival Big Cousins, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 2Q01, at 1. A part of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Ginnie Mae, "proides credit
guarantees for securities backed by mortgages issued by other governmental
agencies." Id. This legislation is significant because it would give Ginnie Mae access
to a large portion of the secondary mortgage industry. Id. Officials from Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac rapidly responded by questioning "the need for the legislation." Id.
187. See supra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
188. Id.
189. Big Scary Monsters, supra note 113, at 59-60.
190. Fernandez, supra note 186, at 1. Indeed, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
argued that the presence of a competitor, such as Ginnie Mae, w~ould "not enhance
the mortgage market and would create a huge risk for taxpayers." Id.
191. See supra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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system is stable as a result of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.'93
However, the GSEs have not been a perfect solution. 4 First,
some subsidy dollars appear to be ending up in the hands of
stockholders rather than mortgage borrowers. 5 Similarly, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac practically dominate the market. 96 Finally,
there are critics who fear a taxpayer bailout."l Unfortunately,
there are no easy solutions to these problems.' Any changes to
the current system will have dramatic effects on mortgage
borrowers, stockholders, taxpayers, and participants within the
mortgage industry. 99 Therefore, decision makers should use
prudence before making changes to the structure and operation of
GSEs. z°°
BRADLEY K. KREHELY
193. Id- Homeownership brings about a number of social and economic benefits
including the creation of wealth for individual homeowners and stability within
communities. Barta & Zuckerman, supra note 2, at Al. Some studies have also
shown that homeowners are more likely to vote and to get involved in parent-teacher
associations. Barta & Zuckerman, supra note 2, at Al.
194. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (listing the criticisms of GSEs).
195. See supra notes 72-109 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 126-67 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 168-90 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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